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ARGUMENT 
I. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR WAIVING THE 
ARGUMENT THAT LUCIDO'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS 
WERE VIOLATED BY THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW 
Appellee first claims that the results of the blood draw were properly admitted 
because Lucido's "implied consent was in effect and he was incapable of revoking that 
consent" (Br. of Appellee at 23). Thus, Appellee relies squarely on the argument that 
Lucido's Fourth Amendment rights are to be ignored because Utah Code Annotated § 
41-6-44.10 allows for implied consent to warrantless blood draws. Lucido, however, 
asserts that § 41-6-44.10 does not override Fourth Amendment protections against 
warrantless searches and seizures and, as such, Appellee's reliance on § 41-6-44.10 is 
misplaced. 
To support its position that any reliance on the Fourth Amendment would be 
futile because Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10 allows for warrantless blood draws, 
Appellee misapplies State v. Wight, 765 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1988). In Wight, the 
defendant was unconscious when an officer had a certified technician draw his blood. 
765 P.2d at 14. On appeal, the defendant asserted that his trial counsel failed to object 
to admission of the blood evidence "because the blood was not seized pursuant to a 
valid arrest and a proper foundation was not established." Id. at 16. The defendant 
further asserted that "the State laid an inadequate foundation for the blood sample and 
blood test results because the test was taken two hours or more after the accident, and 
because a sufficient chain of custody was not established." Id. This Court correctly 
determined that, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10, an arrest is not 
required prior to taking a blood sample. Id. This Court also correctly determined that 
the State laid a proper foundation for the evidence and the chain of custody was 
sufficiently established and affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id. 
Because the conviction in Wight was affirmed, Appellee assumes that any 
"further challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds would be futile" (Br. of Appellee at 
15). However, Appellee fails to recognize that the defendant in Wight never asserted 
that the blood draw was taken in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Wight, 765 
P.2d at 16. Thus, this Court was not required to consider and did not consider search 
and seizure law which may have been applicable to the facts of that case. Id. 
Therefore, Wight is not applicable to the present case. 
7 
It is elementary that the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are made 
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). As such, by 
enacting Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44.10, the Utah Legislature has not and simply 
can not ignore the protections in the Fourth Amendment. Moreover, it is clear that the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 
L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), found blood testing procedures to "plainly constitute searches of 
persons" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, stating: 
Compulsory administration of a blood test... plainly involves the broadly 
conceived reach of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment.... Such 
testing procedures plainly constitute searches of "persons" and depend 
antecedently upon seizures of "persons", within the meaning of that 
Amendment.... [T]he Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not 
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the 
circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner. In other words, the 
questions we must decide in this case are whether the police were justified in 
requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and 
procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment 
standards of reasonableness. 
Id. at 767; 86 S.Ct. at 1834; 16 L.Ed.2d at 914. 
Accordingly, Appellee's argument that the "implied consent" found in § 41-6-
44.10 effectively overcomes any Fourth Amendment concerns to a warrantless blood 
draw is without any basis in law. The Fourth Amendment protects against warrantless 
blood draws and trial counsel was ineffective for waiving the warrantless blood draw 
issue. 
3 
Next, Appellee argues that any reliance on State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 
198, 93 P.3d 854, is futile because Rodriguez was decided in 2004 and Lucido was 
convicted in 2002 (Br. of Appellee at 15). Appellee claims that Rodriguez "differs 
from prior case law" addressing Fourth Amendment protections and that trial counsel 
was not ineffective because "under available case law" at the time of trial, any 
suppression motion based on Fourth Amendment protections would fail (Br. of 
Appellee at 17-18). Lucido asserts that Appellee's argument is incorrect since 
Rodriguez added nothing new to the framework of Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Appellee recognizes that the applicable law at the time of trial was Schmerber 
and City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1994). Appellee claims that 
Rodriguez differs from prior case law because it requires a trial court to consider 
relevant factors such as "the distance to the nearest magistrate, the availability of a 
telephonic warrant, the feasibility of a stake-out or other form of surveillance while a 
warrant is being obtained, the seriousness of the underlying alcohol-related offense, the 
commission of another offense such as fleeing the scene, the ongoing and continuing 
nature of an investigation, the extent of probable cause, and the conduct of the 
investigating officers" in determining exigent circumstances. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 
198 at f 16; citing Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1392. Appellee then asserts that prior case law 
never required trial courts to consider these factors, but that Schmerber supposedly 
allows courts of appeal to "presume" that exigent circumstances exist and that 
4 
Rodriguez "places an affirmative obligation" on trial courts to consider these factors 
(Br. of Appellee at 18). 
Appellee is incorrect that Rodriguez departs from prior case law by "plac[ing] an 
affirmative duty" on trial courts to consider the specific factors in Henrie. These are 
relevant factors only to be considered under the totality of the circumstances. 
Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198 at \ 16. Moreover, Rodriguez does not turn on the 
analysis of whether an officer attempted to obtain a telephonic warrant. Rodriguez is 
clear that no one single factor is determinative, but the totality of the circumstances "is 
often a mosaic of evidence, no single part of which is itself sufficient." Id. at if 15. 
Accordingly, Appellee's argument that Rodriguez departs from prior case law is 
without basis. 
Furthermore, even if Appellee is correct that trial counsel could not rely upon 
Rodriguez merely because it was decided after the trial, Lucido asserts that if his trial 
counsel had moved to suppress the warrantless blood draw evidence based on Fourth 
Amendment protections, it is apparent that this Court would have granted it because the 
facts in this case are strikingly similar to the facts in Rodriguez. Rodriguez added 
nothing new to Fourth Amendment analysis regarding warrantless blood draws and as 
such, a motion by trial counsel would have been granted. 
Appellee further attempts to distinguish Rodriguez by claiming that Lucido was 
not under the influence of alcohol, but drugs (Br. of Appellee at 17). Appellee then 
claims that "some drugs remain in the blood for months while other drugs remain for 
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only hours," to support its position that exigent circumstances exist whenever a person 
may have ingested an illegal substance (Br. of Appellee at 17). Not only is Appellee's 
argument without foundation, it ignores prior case law and important policy. This 
Court in Henrie and Rodriguez rejected a finding of exigent circumstances in similar 
situations based solely on possible ingestion of a metabolizing substance. Thus, this 
argument is also without a basis in law. 
Finally, Appellee is incorrect that trial counsel's ineffectiveness was harmless. 
Appellee merely relies on its argument that because "implied consent" could not be 
withdrawn due to Lucido's unconsciousness, a suppression motion based on the Fourth 
Amendment would have been useless since § 41-6-44.10 overcomes the need for a 
warrant (Br. of Appellee at 20-22). As stated above, this position is entirely without a 
basis in law and is in direct conflict with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Lucido 
asks this Court to reverse his convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of January, 2005. 
Patrick V. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
